Workmen\u27s Compensation--Assault by Third Person--Liability of Employer by Levine, Herbert B.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2
1953
Workmen's Compensation--Assault by Third
Person--Liability of Employer
Herbert B. Levine
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Herbert B. Levine, Workmen's Compensation--Assault by Third Person--Liability of Employer, 4 W. Res. L. Rev. 181 (1953)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol4/iss2/14
RECENT DECISIONS
extent that the management must provide some screened seats, thus giving
the spectator the opportunity of occupying them. 6 Holding that hockey was
not so umversally played and known as baseball the court in the principal
case refused to apply the "baseball rule."7
Those jurisdictions denying recovery in hockey cases have applied the
"baseball rule" on the theory that in that particular locality hockey is as
well known as baseball.8
It is questionable as to how long this decision will stand since it is based
on the premise that hockey, despite newspaper, radio, television and mo-
tion picture coverage, is not a game which is generally known to cause
injury to spectators.
ROBERT A. FRn ,
WORKMENIS CO1M!PENSATION -ASSAULT BY THIRD PERSON-
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER
The plaintiff sued for compensation for her husband's death under the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation statte1 Her husband had been shot
and killed while working as a laborer. The sole reason for the homicide
was the killer's belief that the deceased employee had been having an affair
with the killer's wife. Held: The death arose out of the employment and
therefore was compensable.2
Workmen's Compensation statutes, in general, require that the accident,
to be compensable, must "arise out of" the employment$ The vast majority
of courts dealing with the question have held that an injury inflicted on an
employee in the course of his employment by one who commits an assault
for motives unrelated to the employment is not compensable.' However,
if the assault is committed because the employee engaged in the performance
of his duties, the injury is compensable.5
while the baseball players were practicing. There was dictum to the effect that the
rule would be applied but for this factor.).8Quina v. Recreation Park Ass'n, 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935); Brisson v.
Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W 903. (1932);.
Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 215 N.C. 64, 1 S.E.2d 131 (1939).
'Accord, Uline Ice, Inc. v. Sullivan, 187 F2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1950);. Shurman. v..
Fresno Ice Rink, Inc, 91 Cal. App.2d 469, 205 P.2d 77 (1949) (Defendant.had
even posted warmng-signs and made loud speaker announcements.); Thurman v..
(Cune, 51 Cal. App.2d 505, 125 P.2d 59 (1942); Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36.Cal,
App.2d 364,.97 P.2d 999 (1939); Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Gardin
Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 NXE.2d'I (1936); Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144
Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943); James v. R. I. Auditorium, Inc., 60 R.I. 405, 199.
Ad. 293 (1938).
8Modec v. City of Eveleth, 244 Mian. 556, 29 N.W.2d 453 (1947); Hammel v.
Madlison Square Garden Corp., 156"Misc, 311, 279 N.Y. Supp. g15'-(1 9 35 ; Inigr-
soil v. Onondaga Hockey Club, Ik., 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N.Y.- Slpp--505(1935). 1 " I - - , - -. ""
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The courts have interpreted the provision of the statute requiring the
accident to "arise out of" the employment to mean that the injury must
flow as a rational or natural consequence from a cause originating in a
risk connected with or incidental to the employment.6 If there is no such
causal connection between the employment and the assault, the legislature
did not intend to cast the loss on the employer.' Since the Workmen's
Compensation statutes are remedial, and as such have been liberally con-
strued,9 the courts do not delve into the niceties of "proxiaate cause"'1 so
long as the cause of the injury is not outside of or completely disconnected
with the employment."'
The court in the principal case reasoned that the work of the deceased
'LA. REv. STAT. ut. 23:1031 (1914).
LI=vingston v. Henry and Hall, 59 So.2d 892 (La. App. 1952).
'LATry, INTRODUCTION TO BusiNEss AsSOCIATIONS 214 (1951).
'Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal. App.2d 495, 233 P.2d 612 (1951); Bryden v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission, 62 Cal. App. 3, 215 Pac. 1035 (1923); Willis v. Tay-
lor and Fenn Co., 137 Conn. 626, 79 A.2d 821 (1951); Jackson v. Wilson, 84 Ga.
App. 684, 67 S.E.2d 161 (1951); City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292
Ill. 406, 127 N.E. 49 (1920); January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705,
22 S.W.2d 117 (1929); Ramos v. Taxi Transit Co., 276 App. Div. 101, 92
N.Y.S.2d 744 (1949), aff'd., 301 N.Y. 749, 95 N.E.2d 625 (1950); Coope v.
Loews Gate Theater, 215 App. Div. 259, 213 N.Y. Supp. 254 (1926); Shoemaker
v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 66 Ohio App. 224, 31 N.E.2d 92 (1940); Rothfarb
v. Camp Awanee, Inc., 116 Vt. 172, 71 A.2d 569 (1950) HoRovrTz, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATiON 136-139 (1944).
5 The distinction is well pointed up by the cases that hold that if a watchman or other
employee is injured by a burglar while the former is protecting his employers
property from theft, the injury is compensable; whereas, if the employee is injured
by a burglar while the latter is attempting to steal the property of the employee and
not that of the employer, the injury did not arise out of the employment. Bryden
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 62 Cal. App. 3, 215 Pac. 1035 (1923); Winck
v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 503 (1938); Langenheima v.
Industrial Commission of Ohio, 25 Ohio App. 1, 158 N.E. 605 (1927); Sinclair
Prairie Oil Marketing Co. v. King, 185 Okla. 570, 94 P.2d 911 (1939).
'Scott v. Industrial Commission, 374 Ill. 225, 29 N.E.2d 93 (1940); January-
Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S.W.2d 117 (1929); Coope v. Loew's
Gate Theater, 215 App. Div. 259, 213 N.Y. Supp. 254 (1926).
"Scott v. Industrial Commission, 374 Ill. 225, 29 N.E.2d 93 (1940); Metz v. In-
dustrial Commission of Ohio, 134 Ohio St. 36, 15 N.E.2d 632 (1938); Rothfarb v.
Camp Awanee, Inc., 116 Vt. 172, 71 A.2d 569 (1950). 6 SCHNEDER, WORKMEN's
COMPENSATION LAW 7 (3d ed. 1948).
'State ex rel. Common School District No. 1 in Itasca v. District Court of Itasca
County, 140 Minn. 470, 168 N.W 555 (1918); Langenheim v. Industrial Com-
mission of Ohio, 25 Ohio App. 1, 158 N.E. 605 (1927).
'Delassandro v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 110 Ohio St 506, 144 N.E. 138
(1924).
"Scott v. Industrial Commission, 374 Ill. 225, 29 N.E.2d 93 (1940); January-
Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S.W.2d 117 (1929).
"Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cit. 1940),
[Winter
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required him to be at the place where he was killed, this being a "zone of
special danger,"' 2 and that no more was necessary for recovery under the
statute "than that the work subject the employee to a peril which comes
from the fact that he is required to be in the place where it strikes when it
does so."'3 However, such reasoning ignores the fact that, in view of the
motives involved in this case, the killing would probably have occurred
wherever the husband happened to the find the employee.' 4 The fact that
the employee was killed because he was alienating the affections of an-
other man's wife is not a risk that is traceable to his employment as a laborer
on a highway.1 To extend the Workmen's Compensation statutes' pro-
vision to a situation involving a personal assault is, in effect, making the
cert. denmd, 309 U.S. 689, 60 Sup. Ct. 891 (1940); Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal.
App.2d 495, 233 P.2d 612 (1951).
Other tests have also been proposed. The injury must at least be an incident
of the employment. Willis v. Taylor and Fenn Co., 137 Conn. 626, 79 A.2d 821
(1951); City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 Ill. 406, 127 N.E. 49
(1920). The injury must not be merely contemporaneous or coincident with or
collateral to the employment. January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22
S.W.2d 117 (1929). The employment must cause a special degree of exposure to
risk beyond that suffered by the general public. Coope v. Loew's Gate Theater, 215
App. Div. 259, 213 N.Y. Supp. 254 (1926). The injury must have been sustained
because of the employment, in furtherance of the employer's interests or in the per-
formance of acts reasonably related to the employer's interests. Willis v. Taylor and
Fenn Co., supra, Stark v. Wilson, 114 Kan. 459, 219 Pac. 507 (1923); Delassandro
v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 110 Ohio St. 506, 144 N.E. 138 (1924).
' See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 71 Sup. Ct 470 (1951);
Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry Commission, 60 So.2d 449 (La. Sup. Ct. 1952).
PRossER, TORTS 533 (1941).
Thorn v. Sinclair, [1917] A.C. 127, 143 explains this doctrine: [The expres-
sion "arising out of" the employment] " applies to the employment as such -
to its nature, its obligations, and its incidents. If by reason of any of these the
workman is brought within the zone of special danger and so injured or killed, it
appears that the broad words of the statute 'arising out of the employment'
apply. It was part of the conditions of the appellant's labour and part of the
obligations which she undertook as a servant of the respondent that she should at
the time of the accident occupy this particular place of work which turned out to be
a place of special danger. Her service there and not anywhere else brought her into
the position of being subjected to this peril."
'Livingston v. Henry and Hall, 59 So.2d 892, 895 (La. App. 1952).
" Bryden v. Industrial Accident Commission, 62 Cal. App. 3, 215 Pac. 1035 (1923);
Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 55 So.2d 381 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1951), rev'd op
rehearing, 59 So.2d 294 (1952).
"January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S.W.2d 117 (1929); Ramos
v. Taxi Transit Co., 276 App. Div. 101, 92 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1949), 41A'd, 301 N.Y.
749, 95 N.E.2d 625 (1950); Coope v. Loew's Gate Theater, 215 App. Div. 259,
213 N.Y. Supp. 254 (1926); Shoemaker v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 66 Ohio
App. 224, 31 N.E2d 92 (1940). In these cases, an employee was assaulted be-
cause the attacker believed the employee to be the paramour of his wife. The facts
are directly in point with the principal case, and in all these cases the injury was
held noncompensable since it was personal in origin.
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